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The main objective of this paper is to point out the key relevance of the classifi-
cation issue in mathematical modeling. In particular, it is stressed that standard
logical structures are quite simple classification structures, where the allowed de-
grees of truth or falsehood are connected according to a linear ordering. But when
viewed as a classification problem, much more complex logical structures appear
in a natural way, showing in fact that the standard linear assumption was kind
of artificial. Moreover, once we focus our attention on the classification problem
we realize that a relevant portion of classical research devotes to decision making,
therefore imposing some misleading restrictions: the true scientific issue is much
more related to classification rather than to decision making.
1. Introduction
Mathematics model reality, but this modeling process is usually made from
a particular philosophical position, which some times is not fully formalized
but granted, and it explains why certain tools are chosen or rejected. Two
centuries ago, for example, scientists use to search for an exact prediction
of system behavior assuming a complete knowledge of its circumstances,
so there was no room for any kind of uncertainty. If we are modeling
human behavior, for example, and we postulate that we should not care
about opinions but about acts, then we may be forced to model decision
making procedures assuring consistent outputs, with no room for fuzziness
(acts al always crisp, see Montero18 for a discussion on this issue). More-
over, a previous formal definition for consistency is then required (it has
been traditionally associated to transitivity, but Bayesian Theory25 imposes
completeness, in addition).
Within Fuzzy Sets Theory, an analogous decision making approach has
produced a number of fuzzy transitivity definitions, always generalizing clas-
sical crisp transitivity22, sometimes with discouraging results21. Alternative
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approaches to fuzzy rationality12,13 are also focused from a decision making
point of view, transitivity playing a key role.
In this paper it is pointed out that perhaps consistency of decision mak-
ing should not be our objective as scientists, but consistency of the previous
analysis. In fact, real decision makers do not hire us in order to make the
decision instead of them, but in order to help them to get a better un-
derstanding of the problem they are faced to (see, e.g., Pearman et al.19).
Mathematical models should always be viewed as decision aid tools (see
Roy24).
2. Crisp consistency in decision making
An nice example in Mathematics is the Bayesian Theory of Probability,
where decision making is a corner stone.
As already pointed out in Montero-Mendel18, Bayesian Theory is built
upon a crisp space of actions. In fact, in the Bayesian Theory ”probability”
does not exist, neither in the physical world or our mind, but ”in the records
of the gambles” we have agreed to accept in the past. Bayesians do not
care if concepts are crisp or fuzzy. They are only sure about their own acts,
no matter their own supporting arguments. Crispness assumption in the
Bayesian model applies to acts, and the Bayesian model refers just to acts.
It can be argued that although acts are always crisp, such a crispness does
not apply to most decisions human beings take27,24. Bayesian researchers
will still claim that only occurrence of those crisp acts can be checked (the
set of acts must be therefore well defined). Science can be built only from
these observable facts, so every conceptual tool is operational18.
Bayesian Theory builds up a model for Probability on the basis of the
decisions we make. Then, it can be proven that my acts can be explained by
means of Probability, provided that these acts are consistent. Another key
assumption is then the definition of consistency. In particular, it is being
assumed that alternatives can be represented in the real line, therefore
defining a linear order: we can always choose the best alternative among
any pair, in such a way that transitivity holds.
A relevant part of applied mathematics is focused towards decision mak-
ing. It is being assumed that the key issue is to analyze decision making,
how to assure consistency of our acts. In this paper we shall discuss the
role of decision making in mathematical modeling, pointing out that per-
haps we should focus our attention in knowledge acquisition rather than
decision making. Some interesting consequences will be then suggested.
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The concept of consistency or rationality may be not the same in those two
different contexts, for example. Some assumptions may be natural within
a classification problem, but forced in a decision making framework.
Crisp consistency use to be associated to transitivity and completeness,
in such a way that decision makers are rational if and only if any set of
alternatives they are shown, their preferences define a linear order. This
approach can be justified in terms of decision making: whenever alterna-
tives are linearly ordered, the best alternative is always defined for any
subset of alternatives we may consider. But human beings violate quite
often the linear order assumption: some times alternatives can not be com-
pared, or transitivity does not hold. So, weaker conditions for transitivity
have been proposed in the past. For example, indifference is obviously non
transitive in practice (see, e.g., Montero12). Or perhaps we can just assure
the existence of a small enough non-empty choice set, so a detailed analysis
can be restricted only to few alternatives23.
3. Fuzzy consistency in decision making
Analogous decision making approach can be found in many classical pa-
pers devoted to fuzzy preference representation22. But if transitivity is
frequently violated within a crisp context, standard fuzzy transitivities are
even difficult to be checked. Therefore, instead of asking decision makers
to revise their intensity values, we can try to search for a close enough con-
sistent fuzzy preference relation, expecting it will be accepted after all20.
But these acceptance may be not trustable, since most decision makers are
far away from a direct intuition of big data structures.
An interesting alternative, still under the same decision making frame-
work, has been proposed in the past by Montero12,13,16 and Cutello-
Montero4,5,6, by considering consistency as a fuzzy property. This approach
allowed, see next section, an interesting alternative result to Arrow’s Para-
dox, showing that this classical results can be viewed as the impossibility
of a perfect aggregation rule12. Similar fuzzy approaches have been tried by
other authors, still modeling decision making fuzzy consistency.
4. Consistency in group decision making
Let us consider, for example, group decision making problems: how to
obtain an amalgamated preference for a finite family of (at least two) indi-
viduals expressing their preferences about a finite number of alternatives.
In case those preferences are assumed to be crisp, Arrows theorem2
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shows that in case of dealing with at least three alternatives, there is no
amalgamating democratic rational rule (consistent and ethical). Since then,
quite a number of alternative impossibility theorems have been obtained9,26,
introducing different formal definitions for consistent and ethical. As
pointed out in Montero12, a key unexplained assumption within this con-
text is the crisp view of these two properties (either the group is consistent
or not, either it is ethical or not), and the crisp support for their prefer-
ences (either one alternative is preferred to another alternative or it is the
other way round). Here we find that consistency for group and individuals
is conceived from a decision making point of view (a linear order is being
imposed for groups and individual preferences).
Within a fuzzy context we may escape to Arrow’s impossibility theorem,
in the sense that we can measure degrees of verification of being consistent
and ethical, no matter their crisp definition12,13. Hence, instead of search-
ing for a perfect rule, we can search for some kind of compromising rule,
consistent enough and ethical enough (see also Montero11,14). Still, this
result was still conceived from a decision making viewpoint (it was basi-
cally measured the degree consistency of the associated decision making
problem). Although alternative consistency measures can be considered5,
most of existing consistency measures16,4,6 take mainly into account the
associated decision making problem.
Nevertheless, Black3 proved a true possibility theorem within the crisp
context, but introducing a key restriction on individual preferences, so they
are single peacked, i.e., all those preferences can be represented within a real
line in such a way that between every pair of alternatives each indivudual
always prefer the closest one to the best one, which of course exists. But
it should be realized that this restriction seems too sophisticated... unless
such a particular structure is a priori imposed. This has been the situation
in many democratic countries, where people were told to choose among ”ex-
treme left”, ”moderate left”, ”moderate right” and ”extreme right” parties.
From a decision making point of view, Black’s single peakedness condition
sounds strange, but such a property may be considered natural within a
classification problem, were the classes structure1 is given to us as data
(see Montero15 for a fuzzy version of Blak’s result).
5. Final comments
As pointed out above, conceiving decision making as a goal may be mis-
leading our research, bringing us to a hostile framework were no solution
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can be obtained. Good decision makers need not to be consistent, since
the problems they face are always different (in place, time or any other
circumstance). We can only stress consistency of the previous analytic
model, which may produce certain classification, of course subject to un-
certainty. For example, consistency within classification1,17, may be easier
to assume than consistency within decision making. Hence, we should focus
our studies in developing representation tools7,8 for decision aiding rather
than proper decision making tools10,24,27. Weaker consistency conditions
will appear, just pursuing an illustrative representation of decision maker
preferences. In this sense, it is claimed much more theoretical effort in
developing consistent fuzzy representation tools.
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